Mandamus to the Rescue? Forcing the Senate to Quit Stalling Duterte’s Impeachment

By Louis ‘Barok’ C Biraogo — June 9, 2025

THE impeachment saga of Vice President Sara Duterte isn’t just a legal skirmish—it’s a stress test for Philippine democracy, and the early results are grim. The Senate’s glacial pace in convening an impeachment court, despite the 1987 Constitution’s clear command to act “forthwith,” has turned a solemn accountability mechanism into a procedural circus. Add to that a questionable mandamus petition, a House accused of sidestepping constitutional guardrails, and an Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) playing fast and loose with court rules, and you’ve got a recipe for institutional chaos. The Supreme Court now faces a dilemma: step in to uphold constitutionalism or stand back and let political gamesmanship run wild. Here’s the unvarnished breakdown—buckle up.

The Senate’s Duty: “Forthwith” Isn’t a Suggestion

Article XI, Section 3(6) of the 1987 Constitution doesn’t mince words: once the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment, the Senate “shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment” and must proceed “forthwith.”¹ The House did its part, voting to impeach Vice President Sara Duterte on February 5, 2025, and sending the articles to the Senate that same day.² Yet, Senate President Chiz Escudero kicked the can down the road, delaying the reading of the articles—impeachment’s starting gun—from June 2 to June 11, the last gasp of the 19th Congress.³ Worse, whispers of a draft resolution to drop the trial entirely surfaced by June 4, suggesting the Senate might just punt the whole thing.⁴

Is “forthwith” a ministerial mandate or a discretionary shrug? The Constitution’s plain language leans hard toward the former—“shall” and “forthwith” scream urgency, not dawdling. In Rio v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 231053, 2018), the Supreme Court clarified that mandamus can compel a ministerial act—one where no judgment or discretion is involved.⁵ Catalino Generillo, a former PCGG lawyer, seized on this in his February 13, 2025, mandamus petition (G.R. No. 278311), demanding the Senate get moving.⁶ He’s got a point: if “forthwith” means anything, it’s not “whenever we feel like it.” Contrast this with the 2012 impeachment of Chief Justice Renato Corona, where the Senate convened swiftly, held 44 trial days, and delivered a verdict in under five months.⁷ The current dithering makes “forthwith” sound like a suggestion, not a command—a textbook case of constitutional negligence.

But here’s the rub: the Senate’s pace involves some discretion. Scheduling, evidence rules, and trial logistics aren’t robotic tasks. The Supreme Court, wary of the political question doctrine from Francisco v. House (G.R. No. 160261, 2003), might hesitate to micromanage.⁸ That case held that impeachment’s substance is off-limits to judicial review, but procedural lapses are fair game. Generillo’s petition threads this needle, arguing the delay itself is a grave constitutional violation. He leans on Macalintal v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 157013, 2003), where the Court stepped in for “exceptional” cases with “paramount public interest.”⁹ Impeaching a vice president fits that bill—public trust in governance hangs in the balance. Still, the Court might dodge, deeming the Senate’s timeline a political call. If so, expect a slow-motion train wreck.

The House’s Tactics: Due Process or Dirty Pool?

The House isn’t exactly wearing a halo either. Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution bars a second impeachment complaint within one year of the first.¹⁰ Critics, including Duterte’s camp, allege the House gamed this rule. After three complaints fizzled in December 2024, a fourth—the one that stuck—rolled out in February 2025, with the House Secretary General allegedly buying time to make it stick.¹¹ Duterte’s petition (G.R. No. 278353) cries foul, claiming this serial filing spree violates due process and the one-year bar.¹²

Gutierrez v. House (G.R. No. 193459, 2011) offers a lifeline here.¹³ The Court ruled it could scrutinize impeachment procedures for constitutional compliance, striking down a House move that ignored its own rules. If the House’s multiple complaints were substantively the same—a coordinated pile-on to dodge the one-year limit—Duterte’s got a case. But if each complaint raised distinct grounds (say, graft versus betrayal of public trust), the House might squeak by. The record’s murky, but the optics stink: a rushed vote on February 5, followed by a handoff to a reluctant Senate, reeks of political vendetta. Reports of a Duterte-Marcos Jr. rift fuel the fire—is this impeachment a policy critique or a 2028 election hit job?¹⁴ The House’s maneuvers flirt with procedural sabotage, and the Supreme Court, per Gutierrez, has the chops to call it out.

Ethical Quagmire: OSG’s Procedural Brinkmanship

Enter the Office of the Solicitor General, stage left, with a performance that’d make a courtroom drama blush. After Generillo’s mandamus filing, the Supreme Court on February 18, 2025, ordered comments from the Senate and OSG within a “non-extendible” 10 days.¹⁵ Shockingly, both claimed to get the order 70 days late—April 29—and the OSG had the gall to beg for a 15-day extension, citing “heavy workload.”¹⁶ Generillo pounced, noting Section 12 of the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure bans such extensions without prior court approval.¹⁷ Undeterred, the OSG mailed its comment on May 24—before the Court ruled on the extension—a move Generillo slammed as “not authorized.”¹⁸

This is procedural brinkmanship at its worst. Republic Act No. 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, demands integrity and efficiency from the OSG.¹⁹ Flouting court deadlines and filing comments sans permission isn’t just sloppy—it’s a middle finger to judicial process. The Supreme Court’s silence as of May 19 on the extension request only deepens the mess.²⁰ If the justices let this slide, they’re greenlighting chaos; if they crack down, the OSG’s credibility takes a hit. Either way, this sideshow erodes public faith in a process already on life support.

Institutional Failures: A Race to the Bottom

Zoom out, and the picture’s uglier. The Senate’s delay mocks the Constitution’s urgency, risking a precedent where “forthwith” means “someday.” The House’s alleged end-run around the one-year bar undermines due process, turning impeachment into a weapon. And the OSG’s antics—coupled with a 70-day delivery lag for a Supreme Court order—suggest either incompetence or sabotage. Compare this to the Corona trial: the Senate moved fast, the House played by the book, and the process, while messy, held.²¹ Today’s free-for-all threatens to make impeachment a partisan farce, not a check on power.

Ethically, this violates RA 6713’s call for accountability and transparency.²² Civic groups like the Ateneo Human Rights Center have it right: “impeachment delayed is justice denied.”²³ The public deserves a swift, fair trial, not a political soap opera. Yet, whispers of a Marcos-Duterte feud hint at deeper motives—a power play to kneecap Duterte’s 2028 run.²⁴ If true, both chambers and the OSG are complicit in a betrayal of public trust. The Constitution envisioned impeachment as a scalpel, not a sledgehammer.

The Supreme Court’s Tightrope: Justice or Deference?

So, where does this leave us? The Supreme Court holds the cards. Generillo’s mandamus petition (G.R. No. 278311) tests whether “forthwith” is enforceable. Precedent leans cautious—Francisco limits judicial meddling—but Gutierrez and Macalintal open the door for procedural fixes in “exceptional” cases.²⁵ A ruling for Generillo could force the Senate’s hand, but overreach risks a separation-of-powers clash. Duterte’s petition (G.R. No. 278353) hangs on the one-year bar; if the Court finds a House violation, the impeachment’s dead. But deference to Congress might prevail, leaving the process to fester.

Outcomes? If the Senate convenes on June 11, a rushed trial could compromise fairness—19 days, as Senator Tolentino proposed, is a blink.²⁶ Carrying it over to the 20th Congress, as Escudero mused, defies the “forthwith” spirit.²⁷ Worst case: the Senate drops the trial, and the Court ducks, cementing a legacy of constitutional dodgeball. Best case: the justices demand accountability—order the Senate to move, scrub the House’s shady tactics—and restore some dignity to the process.

The Verdict: Democracy on the Brink

This isn’t just about Sara Duterte—it’s about whether the Philippines can hold its leaders to account without descending into chaos. The Senate’s stalling, the House’s dodgy moves, and the OSG’s procedural games are a triple threat to constitutional order. The Supreme Court must decide: uphold the 1987 Constitution’s clear mandates or defer to a political mess. If it’s the latter, impeachment becomes a punchline, and public trust—already battered—takes another hit. Buckle up, folks—this is a masterclass in how to bungle democracy, one delay at a time.

Footnotes

¹ THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. XI, Sec. 3(6), Official Gazette.
² “Ex-PCGG lawyer wants SC ruling to nudge Senate on VP’s impeachment,” Rappler, June 9, 2025
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Rio v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 273136, August 20, 2024, Supreme Court of the Philippines
⁶ “Ex-PCGG lawyer wants SC ruling to nudge Senate on VP’s impeachment,” Rappler, June 9, 2025
⁷ “Impeachment in the Philippines,” Wikipedia
⁸ Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 2003, LawPhil
⁹ Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, 2003, Supreme Court eLibrary
¹⁰ THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 3(5), Official Gazette
¹¹ “Philippine VP Duterte’s backers ask Supreme Court to throw out impeachment,” Al Jazeera, Feb. 18, 2025
¹² “SC to House, Senate: Respond to VP Sara Duterte petition vs impeachment,” Inquirer, June 9, 2025, .
¹³ Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459, 2011, Supreme Court eLibrary
¹⁴ “Duterte’s impeachment and the spectacle of Philippine politics,” East Asia Forum, Feb. 25, 2025, .
¹⁵ “PRESS BRIEFER – Supreme Court of the Philippines,” Feb. 18, 2025
¹⁶ “Ex-PCGG lawyer wants SC ruling to nudge Senate on VP’s impeachment,” Rappler, June 9, 2025
¹⁷ 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Sec. 12, LawPhil
¹⁸ “Ex-PCGG lawyer wants SC ruling to nudge Senate on VP’s impeachment,” Rappler, June 9, 2025
¹⁹ Republic Act No. 6713, Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, 1989, LawPhil
²⁰ “Ex-PCGG lawyer wants SC ruling to nudge Senate on VP’s impeachment,” Rappler, June 9, 2025
²¹ “Impeachment in the Philippines,” Wikipedia
²² Republic Act No. 6713, Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, 1989, LawPhil
²³ Research Materials, Survey Note, no URL available.
²⁴ “Duterte’s impeachment and the spectacle of Philippine politics,” East Asia Forum, Feb. 25, 2025
²⁵ Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 2003, LawPhil; Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, Supreme Court eLibrary.
²⁶ Research Materials, Survey Note, no URL available.
²⁷ Research Materials, Survey Note, no URL available.

Disclaimer: This is legal jazz, not gospel. It’s all about interpretation, not absolutes. So, listen closely, but don’t take it as the final word.