DPWH’s Billion-Peso Ghost Party: Bonoan’s “I Didn’t Know” Excuse Is a Flimsy Umbrella in a Corruption Typhoon

By Louis ‘Barok‘ C. Biraogo — August 29, 2025

THE Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) under Secretary Manuel Bonoan is wading through a swamp of corruption so vile it makes Manila’s esteros smell like a perfume counter. Ghost flood control projects, a district engineer caught trying to bribe a congressman with ₱3.1 million, and a jaw-dropping ₱5.97 billion handed to a single contractor for 85 dubious projects in Bulacan alone—this is the DPWH’s latest scandal, where public funds vanish faster than a politician’s promises during campaign season. Bonoan, with the sincerity of a lifeguard napping during a tsunami, swears he’s clean, pointing to delegated district offices and waving preventive suspensions like a get-out-of-jail-free card. But does his “I delegated, I didn’t know” defense hold up, or is it just another crumbling dike in a flood of systemic rot? Let’s carve up this mess with the scalpel of Philippine law, a dash of sarcasm, and a demand for accountability that won’t drown in bureaucratic excuses.

The Scandal: A Quick Dive into the Muck

The Inquirer report lays bare a cesspool of allegations:

Ghost Projects: Flood control projects, some proposed in the National Expenditure Program (NEP), exist only on paper, with ₱5.97 billion allegedly paid to one contractor for 85 non-existent projects in Bulacan.
Bribery Bust: District Engineer Abelardo Calalo was arrested for offering Rep. Leandro Leviste a ₱3.1 million bribe to halt probes into infrastructure scams, hinting at a 5-10% “SOP” (standard operating procedure) kickback culture.
Systemic Rot: Sen. Panfilo Lacson estimates half of the ₱2 trillion allocated for flood control since 2011 may have been siphoned off, with lawmakers like Reps. Terry Ridon and Arnan Panaligan flagging anomalies in Bulacan and Oriental Mindoro.
Bonoan’s Defense: The Secretary denies involvement, claims projects are delegated to district offices, and touts suspensions and planned charges as proof of diligence.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s SONA condemnation of kickbacks adds political heat, but is Bonoan the mastermind, a negligent bystander, or just a guy caught in the rain without an umbrella?

Legal Framework: The Laws That Could Sink Bonoan

Anti-Corruption Statutes

Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act): Section 3(e) punishes public officers for causing “undue injury” to the government or giving “unwarranted benefits” through “manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.” Ghost projects and kickbacks scream violation.
Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards): Sections 4–5 demand “justness, sincerity, and utmost responsibility,” with penalties for soliciting gifts or neglecting duties. The “SOP” culture and oversight failures breach these standards.
Revised Penal Code, Articles 208–212: These criminalize bribery and “negligence and tolerance” in prosecuting offenses, with penalties up to six years’ imprisonment. Calalo’s bribe attempt could implicate higher-ups if tolerance is proven.

Command Responsibility

Executive Order No. 226 (1995): Institutionalizes command responsibility across government, holding superiors liable for subordinates’ acts if they knew, should have known, or failed to act.
Supreme Court Precedents:
- Office of the Ombudsman vs. Fronda and Arias (G.R. No. 211239, April 26, 2021): Extends command responsibility to civilian leaders for supervisory lapses.
- Office of the Ombudsman v. De Chavez (G.R. No. 172206, July 3, 2013): Affirms liability for omissions in systemic corruption cases.
- Yamashita Standard: Adapted in Philippine law, it holds superiors accountable if widespread violations suggest constructive knowledge (Pangalangan, 2016).

Procurement and Oversight

Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act): Mandates transparent bidding, Annual Procurement Plans (APPs), and audits. Ghost projects violate these rules, exposing officers to criminal and administrative sanctions.
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act): Grants the Ombudsman power to investigate, suspend, and prosecute for graft, inefficiency, or misconduct.

Case Against Bonoan: A Leadership Fail So Epic It Deserves Its Own Netflix Series

Bonoan’s critics argue he’s either neck-deep in the muck or so negligent he might as well have handed contractors the keys to the treasury. Here’s why they want his head on a legal platter:

Command Responsibility Means No Hiding Behind Delegation

When ₱5.97 billion vanishes into ghost projects and district engineers are tossing bribes like confetti, EO 226 nails Bonoan for either knowing or should have known about the rot (EO 226, 1995). Ombudsman vs. Fronda and Arias (G.R. No. 211239, 2021) and Ombudsman v. De Chavez (G.R. No. 172206, 2013) make it clear: systemic corruption under a civilian leader triggers liability if oversight is lax. Lacson’s ₱2 trillion estimate and Leviste’s “SOP” allegations suggest a culture so corrupt it’s practically DPWH’s brand identity. Bonoan’s “districts did it” excuse is as flimsy as a ghost project’s blueprint—command responsibility doesn’t let you delegate accountability to the arsonists setting your house ablaze.

Gross Negligence: Sleeping Through a ₱5.97 Billion Heist

RA 3019, Section 3(e), punishes “gross inexcusable negligence” causing government loss. Losing ₱5.97 billion to one contractor isn’t a typo—it’s a neon-lit failure of oversight. Arias v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 81563, 1989) warns heads against “closing their eyes” to red flags. If NEP proposals came from DPWH’s central office, as Ridon claims, Bonoan’s team either missed or ignored glaring fraud. RPC Article 208 could also bite, punishing “tolerance” of subordinates’ crimes. When kickbacks are as routine as morning coffee, negligence isn’t just plausible—it’s probable.

Ethical Breaches: From SMC to DPWH, a Cozy Conflict

RA 6713 demands “justness, sincerity, and responsibility”. Bonoan’s past as SMC Tollways’ head raises eyebrows—did his contractor connections follow him to DPWH like a bad smell? Office of the Ombudsman v. De Chavez (G.R. No. 172206, July 3, 2013) holds that negligence eroding public trust is enough for liability. When your agency’s synonymous with “ghost projects,” you’re not just failing at ethics—you’re starring in a corruption blockbuster.

Arguments Against Bonoan

Argument	Legal Basis	Evidence
Command Responsibility	EO 226 (1995), Ombudsman vs. Fronda and Arias (G.R. No. 211239, 2021), Ombudsman v. De Chavez (G.R. No. 172206, 2013)	₱5.97B ghost projects, widespread “SOP” kickbacks
Gross Negligence	RA 3019 §3(e), RPC Art. 208, Arias v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 81563, 1989)	NEP inclusions, lack of central oversight
Ethical Breaches	RA 6713 §§4–5, Ombudsman v. De Chavez (G.R. No. 172206, 2013)	SMC ties, public trust erosion

Case for Bonoan: A Lifeboat in a Sea of Scandal

Bonoan’s defenders argue he’s more victim than villain, caught in a broken system with a defensible delegation strategy. It’s a bold claim, but it’s like trying to bail out a sinking ship with a teaspoon.

Delegation Is Legal, Not a Crime

The Administrative Code of 1987 (Book III, Chapter 10, Section 39) allows secretaries to delegate for efficiency, retaining only supervisory duties. Bonoan’s claim that district offices handle implementation aligns with DPWH’s decentralized setup. Luciano v. Estrella (G.R. No. L-31622, 1970) shields heads from liability for subordinates’ acts absent proof of connivance shields heads from liability for subordinates’ acts absent proof of connivance. Without evidence of Bonoan pocketing bribes or signing ghost contracts, RA 3019’s intent requirement is a tough hurdle (RA 3019, 1960). His defense: “I set the rules; districts broke them.” It’s not ironclad, but it’s a start.

Proactive Steps: Not Just Window Dressing

Bonoan’s preventive suspensions and planned charges against culprits like Calalo show he’s not entirely asleep. RA 6770, Section 24, endorses suspensions during probes, and Atty. Amado Q. Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman and DOF-RIPS (G.R. No. 210128, August 24, 2016) rewards good-faith actions. RA 6713’s “prompt action” mandate (Section 5(b)) gives him credit for trying to clean up. Suspending a few bad apples isn’t a cure, but it’s more than nothing.

Burden of Proof: No Smoking Gun

RA 3019 and RPC require proof beyond reasonable doubt of intent or gross negligence. The Yamashita standard, as adapted, demands actual or constructive knowledge (Pangalangan, 2016). Office of the Ombudsman v. de los Reyes, Jr. (G.R. No. 208976, 2014) defines gross neglect as “wanton disregard”—a high bar Bonoan’s actions might sidestep, barely.

Arguments For Bonoan

Argument	Legal Basis	Evidence
Valid Delegation	EO 292 §39, Luciano v. Estrella (G.R. No. L-31622, 1970)	Decentralized DPWH structure
Proactive Steps	RA 6770 §24, Atty. Amado Q. Navarro v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 210128, 2016)	Suspensions, planned charges
Burden of Proof	RA 3019, Yamashita (Pangalangan, 2016), Ombudsman v. de los Reyes, Jr. (G.R. No. 208976, 2014)	No evidence of direct involvement

Systemic Rot: The Real Villain

This isn’t just Bonoan’s mess—it’s a procurement system so broken it could star in a horror flick. RA 9184 mandates transparent bidding, yet ghost projects slipping into the NEP suggest fraud starts at the proposal stage (RA 9184, 2003). Belgica v. Ochoa (G.R. No. 208566, 2013) exposed budget insertions as a corruption pipeline, a tactic DPWH seems to have mastered. World Bank and Open Government Partnership reports slam Philippine procurement for vague laws and weak enforcement, making it a magnet for extortion. When one contractor scores ₱5.97 billion for projects as real as a mirage, the system’s not just flawed—it’s a feature, not a bug.

Government Actions: Band-Aids on a Gaping Wound

The government has tools to fight this, but they’re often more theater than surgery. Here’s what’s on the table—and why it’s not enough:

Current Actions and Limitations

Ombudsman Probes: RA 6770 empowers the Ombudsman to investigate, suspend, and prosecute (RA 6770, 1989). They can trace NEP projects, audit funds, and nail culprits. But probes crawl slower than a jeepney in EDSA traffic, and political meddling often dilutes results. Napoles cases show convictions need airtight evidence (Sandiganbayan, 2018).
Criminal Charges: RA 3019, RPC Articles 208–212, and RA 9184 violations offer paths for graft, bribery, and procurement fraud. Plunder charges (₱50 million threshold) could apply if diversions are proven (RA 7080, 1991). But linking Bonoan to the loot requires bank records or witnesses—good luck in a paper-shredding bureaucracy.
Token Fixes: Ethics training? It’s like teaching a fox to guard the henhouse. Without structural change, it’s just a PowerPoint snooze-fest for the corrupt.

Reforms: Stop the Circus, Prosecute the Clowns

To slay this corruption hydra, the government needs more than press releases. Here’s the blueprint:

Immediate Actions

Prosecute Under Command Responsibility: The Ombudsman must use RA 6770 and EO 226 to suspend Bonoan pending a probe. If systemic failures are proven, RA 6713 sanctions (dismissal, disqualification) should hit hard.
Freeze DPWH Budgets: Halt flood control funding until COA audits every peso. No more blank checks for ghost contractors.
Trace the Money: Subpoena bank records and contractor registries to expose shell companies, per Napoles precedents.

Long-Term Reforms

Procurement Transparency: Amend RA 9184 for real-time public tracking on PhilGEPS, using Open Contracting Data Standards.
Beneficial Ownership Registries: Require contractors to disclose true owners to unmask cronies (World Bank, 2020).
Whistleblower Protections: Enact safeguards for insiders exposing graft, per international standards (OGP, 2023).
Empower the Ombudsman: Amend RA 6770 for random audits and faster prosecutions, cutting through red tape.

The Verdict: No More Excuses

Bonoan’s “I didn’t know” defense is as sturdy as a DPWH footbridge in a typhoon. EO 226 (Command Responsibility) and precedent like Ombudsman vs. Fronda and Arias (G.R. No. 211239, 2021) demand he answer for systemic rot, whether he pocketed a peso or not. RA 3019 and RA 6713 set a high bar for negligence and ethical breaches, and ₱5.97 billion in ghost projects screams either willful blindness or gross incompetence. His suspensions and charges are a start, but they’re like mopping the floor during a flood—too little, too late. The Ombudsman must wield RA 6770 like a sledgehammer, prosecuting Bonoan and his cronies if evidence shows negligence or complicity. Congress should tighten RA 9184 to make procurement a glass house, not a black box. Until then, DPWH will remain a monument to corruption, where public funds vanish faster than you can say “SOP.” Stop the circus. Prosecute the clowns.

Key Citations

News Report

Statutes

Supreme Court Cases

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Fronda and Arias (G.R. No. 211239, April 26, 2021)
Office of the Ombudsman v. De Chavez (G.R. No. 172206, July 3, 2013)
Arias v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 81563, 1989)
Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun (G.R. No. 235764, 2021)
Atty. Amado Q. Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman and DOF-RIPS (G.R. No. 210128, August 24, 2016)
Office of the Ombudsman v. Evangelista (G.R. No. 206395, 2018)
Luciano v. Estrella (G.R. No. L-31622, 1970)
Belgica v. Ochoa (G.R. No. 208566, 2013)