ICC’s Manila Blitz: Duterte Down, Senators Next? A Legal Thriller with No Rehearsal

Bato and Bong’s Hague Hangover: Will the Philippines Fumble the Legal Fumble?

By Louis ‘Barok‘ C Biraogo — October 5, 2025

WELCOME to the high-wire act of Philippine justice, where the International Criminal Court (ICC) has already snared former President Rodrigo Duterte, whisked to The Hague in March like a headline ripped from Manila’s streets. Now, former Senator Antonio Trillanes stirs the pot, hinting at arrest warrants for Senators Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa and Christopher “Bong” Go by early next year. Justice Secretary Jesus Crispin Remulla’s response? A measured, “We’ll cross that bridge when we get there.” Some might see this as a cautious pause, but it risks looking like a missed chance to brace for a legal and diplomatic storm. In this global legal chess game, is the Philippines ready to move, or are we just hoping the board stays still? Let’s break down this unfolding drama.

Chapter I: The Bridge Nobody Bothered to Build

The Philippines stands at a legal precipice, with ICC warrants looming like storm clouds. Remulla’s “we’ll cross that bridge” comment suggests a wait-and-see approach, perhaps a nod to the complexities of coordinating with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) or navigating post-Rome Statute withdrawal fog. But with Duterte already in ICC custody, this measured stance could signal a lack of urgency, potentially leaving the nation exposed to a constitutional and diplomatic whirlwind. Why wait for the flood when you could be building the ark?

Chapter II: The Legal Arena – Swords Drawn, Shields Rusty

Enter the legal coliseum, where the Rome Statute swings its blade. Article 27 strips immunity from all—presidents, senators, or otherwise—ensuring no title dodges crimes against humanity. Article 58 empowers the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber to issue arrest warrants on solid evidence, and Article 59 demands swift state action to detain and surrender.

The Philippines’ counter? Republic Act 9851 (2009), our domestic weapon against atrocities, equips us to prosecute locally. Yet, the Supreme Court’s Pangilinan v. Cayetano ruling reminds us that our 2019 Rome Statute exit doesn’t erase obligations for crimes during membership, with Senate concurrence anchoring treaty ties. The tools are there, but has the Department of Justice (DOJ) sharpened them, or are we still searching for the toolbox?

Chapter III: The Players Under the Spotlight

Let’s zoom in on the key figures navigating this legal labyrinth:

Jesus Crispin Remulla, the DOJ’s Cautious Navigator: Remulla’s “no contingency plan” stance could be read as a pragmatic choice to avoid premature moves, given the DFA’s role and legal complexities post-withdrawal. Yet, this restraint risks projecting unpreparedness, potentially undermining public confidence and international trust. A more proactive signal—say, memos on Presidential Decree 1069 (extradition) or RA 9851—could strengthen the DOJ’s hand without overcommitting.
Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa & Christopher “Bong” Go, the Drug War’s Loyal Lieutenants: They might argue their actions were lawful policy, denying intent for crimes against humanity and banking on RA 9851‘s complementarity to keep the ICC at bay. But Article 27 laughs off official titles, and the drug war’s grim toll—over 6,000 dead by government count, higher per rights groups—ties them to a bloody evidence trail. ICC warrants would cage their travel, turning them into Manila-bound senators dodging 125 state parties like fugitives in a thriller. Command responsibility could be their undoing, no matter their protests.

Chapter IV: The Fork of Fate – Moves That Make or Break

The government faces a high-stakes chessboard:

Full Cooperation: Arrest and surrender under Article 59, using RA 9851 and PD 1069 as procedural backbone. It earns global respect but risks domestic backlash—think protests or political shake-ups.
Defiant Stand: Lean on the 2019 withdrawal or Article 98‘s immunity waivers, but brace for diplomatic fallout and Interpol snares, like Sudan’s al-Bashir dodge.
Complementarity Play: Launch credible RA 9851 prosecutions to block ICC jurisdiction. It’s legally viable but demands real judicial grit, not ally protection.
Legislative Misstep: Immunity laws? They’d crash into Supreme Court scrutiny and public outrage.

For Dela Rosa and Go, options are grim:

Hague Face-Off: Challenge ICC evidence or admissibility, risking custody.
Manila Hideout: Stay in non-ICC zones, but forfeit global travel—125 countries become no-go zones.
Asylum Longshot: Seek refuge in uncooperative states, trading Senate clout for global ridicule.
Surrender Gamble: Cooperate voluntarily for leniency, but it’s a tough sell with domestic spin as a fallback.

Chapter V: The Equality-or-Nothing Showdown

Why might the government spare Dela Rosa and Go while Duterte faces The Hague? Maybe Duterte’s role as drug war architect draws heavier evidence, or their Senate seats make arrests politically explosive—disrupting votes or sparking unrest. Health could factor in: Duterte’s 80, they’re younger. Or selective complementarity probes might shield some, not all.

But here’s the rub: Unequal treatment guts the rule of law. RA 9851 and constitutional fairness demand the same standard for all. Selective justice violates international non-selectivity norms, risks ICC and Supreme Court pushback, and erodes public trust. Same process, same rigor—no favorites, no free passes.

Chapter VI: The Republic’s High-Stakes Gamble

This crisis could dent the Philippines’ global standing, alienating ICC allies while the DFA scrambles for cover. The DOJ’s hesitance and the Supreme Court’s tightrope walk over Pangilinan test institutional mettle. Public trust, scarred by the drug war’s 6,000-plus deaths, could either solidify into anti-impunity resolve or fracture into partisan cynicism. Long-term, RA 9851 prosecutions could strengthen justice systems, but dodging accountability entrenches impunity, reducing courts to political props. Will we shine as a rule-of-law beacon or stumble into rogue-state shadows?

Chapter VII: The Final Curtain – Act or Fall

For Remulla/DOJ:

Move now. Form an inter-agency task force with DOJ, DFA, Philippine National Police (PNP), and Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Draft memos on Article 98, RA 9851‘s complementarity, and PD 1069 protocols. Signal transparent domestic probes to victims and the world. Show readiness, not reticence.

For Dela Rosa & Go:

Secure ICC-expert counsel immediately.Avoid travel to ICC states—125 countries are arrest traps. Prep defenses but brace for evidence. Senate bravado won’t help in The Hague.

The Epilogue

Execute any arrests with ~~RA 9851~~‘s precision and constitutional rigor. Dela Rosa and Go must face the same process as Duterte—no exceptions. Anything less betrays justice, leaving the Philippines a nation of loopholes, not law. The stage is set—will we play or let the curtain fall?