DFA Reaffirms Sabah Claim in 2026: Translation – “We Still Own It… On Paper Since 1963”

The Sabah Zombie Returns: Legally Undead, Diplomatically Comatose, and Still Very Annoying

By Louis ‘Barok‘ C. Biraogo — February 23, 2026

MGA ka-kweba, ladies, gentlemen, and the perpetually outraged vloggers who discovered the 2012 NAMRIA map last week and immediately declared World War III: calm your collective tits. On February 20, 2026, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) maritime affairs spokesperson Rogelio Villanueva stepped up to the podium in Pasay and, in the most exquisitely bureaucratic tone imaginable, told the planet that the Philippines still claims Sabah.

Stop the presses. Alert the Sulu heirs. Someone get the Malaysian Foreign Minister a fainting couch. This was no scoop—it was housekeeping with a side of nationalist insurance policy, straight from the DFA reassertion reported by the Philippine News Agency.

***“Maps Are Notice, Not Title: How the Philippines Perfected the Art of Claiming Without Trying”***

DFA’s Big February 2026 Reveal: “Yes, We Still Claim Sabah… No, We’re Not Doing Anything About It”

Villanueva’s greatest hits, translated from Diplospeak to English:

The enactment of the Philippine Maritime Zones Act of 2024, Republic Act No. 12064, has not repealed Section 2 of Republic Act No. 5446.
The depiction of Sabah provides a geographic approximation.
Submission of the map to the United Nations is merely an administrative requirement. Rights are grounded in international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 Arbitral Award.

This is the Villanueva Doctrine—and it is the only genuinely good lawyering in the entire briefing. Sovereignty does not spring from cartography. Maps are notice, not title.

This is the same claim that has been “valid and existing” since the Sulu cession in 1962, formalized in RA 5446, preserved through Republic Act No. 9522, ignored by four administrations, and now politely dusted off because some YouTuber zoomed in on a 14-year-old map.

The Constitutional Comedy: Elastic Words for Elastic Policies

Article I of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines defines national territory as “the Philippine archipelago… and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.”

That phrase is the constitutional equivalent of “it’s complicated” on Facebook. It lets the Executive keep Sabah on life support without ever pulling the plug or committing CPR.

Executive power in foreign affairs is vast. The political question doctrine means the Supreme Court will not force the President to file at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). I know this personally—I was the petitioner in Biraogo v. Del Rosario (G.R. No. 206323, 2013), where I sued to force the DFA to submit the Sabah claim to the ICJ after the Lahad Datu standoff; the Supreme Court dismissed it as a non-justiciable political question, affirming executive discretion in foreign affairs.

The Statutory Shell Game

Republic Act No. 5446, Section 2 contains the explicit saving clause.
Republic Act No. 9522 survived Magallona v. Ermita with Sabah intact.
Republic Act No. 12064 repeals prior baseline definitions but, per the DFA, does not touch the underlying sovereignty claim.

Rules of statutory construction scream: specific provisions prevail; repeals by implication disfavored. The DFA is right on the law. But the ambiguity is deliciously convenient.

International Law: The Convenient Convenience

UNCLOS governs maritime zones, not land sovereignty. The 2016 Award is West Philippine Sea (WPS) gospel; it says nothing about North Borneo.

The 1878 Agreement hinges on “pajakkan” = perpetual lease with annual rent.

The Manila Accord of 1963 contains an explicit commitment to peaceful settlement “by negotiation, arbitration or judicial settlement.” Malaysia signed it, then acts shocked when we remember.

Malaysia’s Sabah Scam Roasted

Malaysia’s position rests on three rickety pillars: a dodgy translation of a 19th-century lease they now call a cession, the Cobbold Commission (a colonial farce), and “effectivités” (effective occupation).

Their favorite party trick? Citing the 2022 Paris Court of Appeal ruling on a rent dispute to disprove state-to-state sovereignty. Cute. Desperate. Embarrassing.

Previous Philippine Administrations: A Master Class in Failure

Macapagal started with fire and ended with a whimper. Marcos Sr. delivered the Jabidah Massacre then quietly dropped the claim for petrodollars. Aquino III offered daily spokesman contradictions during Lahad Datu. Duterte simply said “just drop it.”

The claim survived despite them, not because of them. Article I of the 1987 Constitution is the only adult in the room.

The Marcos Administration: Praise Where Praise Is Due (and It’s Due Here, Grudgingly)

Finally—adults. The DFA separates WPS (rule-based, UNCLOS, 2016 Award) from Sabah (historical title, preserved by statute). No escalation. No waiver by acquiescence. The Villanueva Doctrine—“rights grounded in law, not maps”—is the smartest thing any DFA spokesman has said in a decade.

Options: The Art of the Possible (and the Impossible)

Status quo with teeth (current path)
Bilateral negotiations
Quiet joint development zone (sovereignty reserved)
ICJ adjudication (requires Malaysia’s consent—lol)
Legislification clarification
Full de-emphasis for Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) unity (suicidal)

Resolutions: The Art of the Impossible

The real resolution is time plus effective occupation hardening into accepted fact—unless we stop sleeping on it.

Impacts, Implications, and Consequences

Diplomatic & Security Strain — Heightened tensions in Philippine-Malaysia relations, complicating cooperation on overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), cross-border migration, and joint counter-terrorism efforts.
ASEAN Unity Weakened — Undermines regional solidarity against China in the South China Sea, making it harder to build coalitions when historical claims flare up.
Economic Stakes — Sabah’s rich oil and gas resources remain contested, while roughly one million Filipino workers (many undocumented or in vulnerable positions) in Sabah and broader Malaysia face risks from retaliatory policies, deportations, or restricted labor flows.
Domestic Political Fallout — Fuels nationalist mobilization at home, but invites backlash accusing the administration of reckless adventurism or diplomatic weakness.
Ethical Dilemma — Forces a painful balance between pursuing unfinished decolonization justice (historical title and self-determination) and preserving post-colonial stability and good-neighborly relations.

Recommendations: What Barok Would Do (If Anyone Asked)

The Biraogo Doctrine: Executive primacy in foreign affairs is real, but it demands vigorous non-abandonment, not perpetual punt.

Congress passes a declaratory joint resolution explicitly preserving Sabah sovereignty and directing the DFA to maintain periodic Notes Verbales.
The DFA creates a permanent Sabah Legal-Historical Task Force (with Sulu heirs representation).
Propose to Malaysia a Joint Historical Commission (sovereignty deferred, resources shared).
Quiet bilateral track for modernized lease arrangement with sovereignty reserved.
NAMRIA releases official “without prejudice” map series with clear disclaimers.
Launch a public education campaign—stop letting vloggers own the narrative.
Engage Sulu heirs formally—proprietary claims are separate but can be coordinated.
Prepare a comprehensive ICJ dossier (for the day Malaysia slips).
Issue routine diplomatic notes every two years to prevent acquiescence.
Tie Sabah to broader maritime diplomacy with consistent rule-of-law messaging.

Conclusion: The Claim That Refuses to Die (or Live)

Sabah is the constitutional zombie that keeps shambling forward because Article I of the 1987 Constitution won’t let it rest in peace and no administration has the balls to bury it cleanly.

The DFA’s February 2026 performance was legally correct, diplomatically prudent, and politically necessary. It preserves the claim without blowing up ASEAN or the WPS coalition.

That’s not weakness. That’s calibrated ambiguity—the only sane strategy when you’re outgunned, out-occupied, and surrounded by neighbors who prefer convenient amnesia.

The claim lives. For now. And in the Kweba ni Barok, that’s enough to keep fighting.

Because some things are worth not forgetting.

Even if everyone else wishes we would.

Barok out.