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₱8.9 Billion, 331 Ghost Police Stations: The TIKAS Scandal Explained

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Louis ‘Barok’ Biraogo

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The PNP Asked. DPWH Built. COA Found Nothing. Everyone Shrugs.

By Louis ‘Barok’ C Biraogo — September 12, 2026

Let me get this straight.

The Philippine National Police (PNP)—an organization whose job is law enforcement—needs police stations. Makes sense. Cops need roofs. Even in a country where the roof itself might be a “ghost project.”

So what does the government do? It doesn’t let the PNP build its own stations. No, no. Too simple. Too accountable.

Instead, it routes ₱8.9 billion through the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)—an agency currently drowning in its own flood-control scandal, with an estimated ₱180 billion in ghost projects since 2016—under something called the “TIKAS Convergence Program.”

Tatag ng Imprastraktura Para sa Kapayapaan at Seguridad (TIKAS). Convergence. Sounds so harmonious. Like a symphony. Except the conductor is blind, the musicians are deaf, and the audience just discovered the entire orchestra has been lip-syncing for seven years.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF UNACCOUNTABILITY

The workflow:

  1. PNP says, “We need a police station in Barangay Malayo.”
  2. DPWH says, “Great! We’ll build it.”
  3. Money flows into DPWH’s coffers.
  4. DPWH bids out the project. Or doesn’t. Who knows?
  5. Construction happens. Or doesn’t. Who knows?
  6. Completion is certified. Or falsified. Who knows?
  7. PNP receives the facility. Or doesn’t. Who knows?
  8. The Commission on Audit (COA) audits and finds… nothing. Because nothing was recorded.

This is what governance experts call “a perfect system”—if “perfect” means “perfectly designed to ensure no one is ever held accountable for anything.”

“They Routed ₱8.9B Through DPWH So No One Could Be Blamed. 331 Ghost Police Stations. One Inter-Agency Black Hole. This Is How They Do It.”

THE COA BOMBSHELL: ₱8.9 BILLION IN “HMMMM”

COA—constitutionally mandated to prevent exactly this circus—reportedly found ₱8.9 billion across 331 projects were either:

  1. Unrecorded (“We have no idea where this money went”)
  2. Inadequately documented (“We have receipts, but they’re written in crayon”)
  3. Unfinished (“The building is there, but it’s just a hole in the ground”)

Senate President Win Gatchalian responded with a radical proposal: What if the PNP just built its own police stations?

Revolutionary. Next he’ll suggest the Department of Health should run hospitals.

PNP Chief Gen. Jose Melencio Nartatez Jr., in the most honest admission of institutional dysfunction in recent memory, essentially said: “Yeah, we asked for the projects, but DPWH implemented them. So… not our problem?”

DPWH’s response? Crickets. Probably too busy explaining the other ₱180 billion in missing flood control projects.

THE “IT’S LEGAL, THEREFORE IT’S FINE” DEFENSE

Yes, TIKAS was a legal arrangement. DPWH issued a Special Order in 2021. Budget documents contemplated this setup. The whole thing was sanctioned.

That’s precisely the problem.

Because “legal” and “accountable” are two very different things. TIKAS created “Accountability Schrödinger’s Box”—where ₱8.9 billion exists in a quantum superposition of being both built and not built, everyone’s responsibility and no one’s responsibility, until COA opens the box and finds… a sticky note that says “Sorry for the inconvenience.”

The Constitution says “public office is a public trust.” It doesn’t say “unless the funds are transferred through an inter-agency convergence mechanism, in which case, lol, good luck.”

RA 12009: A MASTERCLASS IN ASPIRATIONAL LEGISLATION

The New Government Procurement Act (Republic Act No. 12009) enshrines: Transparency. Competitiveness. Accountability. Public monitoring. Value for money.

Beautiful principles. Also, in this context, hilarious.

You cannot have “accountability” when the agency that requests the project (PNP) has no control over the agency that implements it (DPWH), and the implementer has no stake in whether the end-user ever receives a functional building.

You cannot have “transparency” when records are split across two bureaucracies, neither obligated to coordinate.

You cannot have “value for money” when you don’t know if the money was spent, what it was spent on, or whether the thing exists.

RA 12009 recognizes “agency-to-agency procurement”—the PNP could hire another government agency with “mandate and absorptive capacity.” This is the legal equivalent of saying, “You can hire a contractor, but only if that contractor is also the government.” Fine—unless that contractor is DPWH. In which case, see: everything above.

THE DND PRECEDENT: A CAUTIONARY TALE

Remember when Gatchalian made the exact same argument about the Department of National Defense (DND)?

In October 2025, he pushed to transfer ₱3 billion in TIKAS funds from DPWH to DND, arguing “our engineers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force can do it.”

The result? The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) acknowledged low completion rates on its own TIKAS projects. 944 approved since 2019. Only 648 completed. Several unfinished. Some “standing but not used.”

So the solution to DPWH’s incompetence was… an agency that also couldn’t finish its projects?

This is like curing a hangover by switching from tequila to vodka.

THE “PNP HAS NO ENGINEERS” COUNTERARGUMENT

Legitimate concern: the PNP is not an infrastructure agency. No nationwide engineering corps. No decades of procurement, contract management, and construction supervision experience.

Hand ₱8.9 billion to an organization that has never managed large-scale infrastructure, and you’re not solving corruption—you’re relocating it.

The PNP’s own audit history isn’t spotless. COA has flagged unrecorded vehicle donations (₱270.6 million), delayed police station construction, and other failures.

So: Who is less likely to screw this up?

Answer: We don’t know, because we don’t have a baseline.

The ₱8.9 billion was never properly recorded. We don’t know how many were completed, functional, or real. We’re comparing DPWH’s documented failure to PNP’s hypothetical competence. That’s not policy debate. That’s a coin flip.

THE REAL QUESTION: WHERE DID THE MONEY GO?

For each of the 331 projects:

  • What was appropriated? Who requested it? Where is it located?
  • Who won the contract? How much was paid? What was completed?
  • Who inspected it? Who certified it? Does it physically exist?
  • Was it turned over to PNP? Is it in PNP’s asset registry? Is anyone using it?

This is not complicated. This is basic project accounting.

If the government cannot answer these questions for ₱8.9 billion in taxpayer money, the problem isn’t DPWH vs. PNP. The problem is a system where ₱8.9 billion can disappear into an administrative black hole and the only consequence is a Senate hearing where everyone says “we’re looking into it.”

THE GHOST PROJECT POSSIBILITY

COA’s findings say “unrecorded,” “incomplete documentation,” “uncompleted.” They do not say “stolen.” They do not say “ghost.”

But “unrecorded” is not “doesn’t exist.” “Uncompleted” is not “never started.”

Most charitable interpretation: bureaucratic incompetence—projects built, paperwork lost between two agencies that never coordinated.

Least charitable: someone figured out that routing money through a convergence program, splitting records across two agencies, and never requiring joint verification lets you build a lot of nothing and nobody notices for years.

Until COA notices. Which is why we’re here.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARY

Article VI, Section 25(5) prohibits transfers of appropriations unless specifically authorized. Araullo v. Aquino III made clear augmentation authority is narrow.

If Gatchalian wants to move TIKAS funds from DPWH to PNP:

  1. Through the 2027 General Appropriations Act (GAA)—appropriate directly to PNP. Constitutionally clean. Congress has the power of the purse.
  2. Through post-enactment transfer—constitutionally dubious, potentially violates Belgica v. Ochoa’s prohibition on legislative participation in budget execution.

Safest path: appropriate the money to PNP in the next budget cycle. No transfers. No convergence. Just: Here’s the money, PNP. Build your own damn police stations.

THE POLITICAL THEATER

Gatchalian is Senate President. He has presidential ambitions. Anti-corruption is a popular brand. DPWH is the most radioactive agency in government.

Taking a hard line against DPWH is good politics. It’s also good policy. Those can coexist.

But the same incentives that make his proposal attractive make it potentially performative. Is he genuinely fixing the accountability gap? Or positioning himself as clean hands in a dirty government?

Probably both. That’s fine. But let’s not mistake a Senate hearing for a solution.

WHAT SHOULD ACTUALLY HAPPEN

Step 1: Forensic audit of all 331 projects. Not a sample. Full, project-by-project reconciliation. Where is the money? Where are the buildings? Who signed what?

Step 2: Classify.

  • Category A: Built, functional, poorly documented. (Remedy: paperwork.)
  • Category B: Built, unfinished/non-functional. (Remedy: contractor sanctions.)
  • Category C: Paid for, not built. (Remedy: COA disallowance, civil recovery, criminal referral.)
  • Category D: Never existed. (Remedy: prosecution, blacklisting, Ombudsman.)

Step 3: Assign accountability. Not “DPWH” or “PNP” as institutions. People. Names. Signatures on certifications.

Step 4: Reform. Documentation failures → better record-keeping and joint verification. Implementation failures → contract management. Ghost projects → prosecution and deterrence.

Step 5: Decide the implementation model. Only after Steps 1-4. If the problem is systemic corruption in construction, changing the procuring agency just changes who’s taking kickbacks.

THE HYBRID MODEL

What nobody wants to say: The PNP probably isn’t ready to manage ₱8.9 billion in infrastructure.

The PNP is a police force. No corps of engineers. No procurement bureaucracy. Handing it ₱8.9 billion and saying “figure it out” is not accountability. It’s abdication.

Better model:

  • PNP identifies the need (they know what they need)
  • PNP validates site and specifications (they know where it goes)
  • DPWH (or another capable agency) implements (they have engineers)
  • PNP jointly inspects and accepts (operational stake)
  • Both maintain synchronized records (no black holes)
  • Independent verification before final payment

This is not rocket science. This is basic project management. The fact that we’re debating it suggests the government has forgotten how to do basic project management.

THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH

TIKAS is not really about DPWH vs. PNP. It’s about a government that has systematically dismantled its own accountability mechanisms over decades.

A procurement system prioritizing speed over transparency, discretion over competition, political convenience over value for money. A COA that can audit but cannot enforce. An Ombudsman that can investigate but cannot prosecute. A Congress that can hold hearings but cannot reform.

A culture where “convergence” is a euphemism for “we don’t want to take responsibility,” and “unrecorded” is a euphemism for “we have no idea where the money went.”

The ₱8.9 billion is a symptom. The disease is much deeper.

FINAL VERDICT

Gatchalian is right there’s an accountability problem. He’s wrong that simply transferring funds to PNP solves it.

DPWH is right it has superior infrastructure capacity. It’s wrong to pretend that capacity has been used responsibly.

PNP is right it should have more control over its own facilities. It’s wrong to pretend it’s blameless.

The real solution:

One project, one accountable official, one set of records, one verification process, one point of accountability.

Until that happens, we’ll keep having this conversation. Except next time, it’ll be ₱18 billion. And 662 projects. And the same excuses.

Welcome to the Philippines, where the ghost projects are real, the accountability is imaginary, and the only thing that gets built is the national debt.

Barok C. Biraogo is a lawyer, governance analyst, and author of the Kweba ni Barok blog. He has not been consulted by any Senate committee, which is probably why his proposals are actually coherent.

Key Citations

A. Reports & Studies

B. News Articles

C. Official Websites & Legal Authorities

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