Heydarian, Cendaña, Gadon Walk Free: SC’s Selective Magnanimity Exposed

87-page self-preservation wrapped in free speech robes — the Court protects itself best.

By Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo | July 19, 2026

IN A display of institutional self-regard so exquisite it deserves its own exhibit at the National Museum, the Supreme Court has deigned not to punish three people who hurt its feelings. Let us all genuflect.

On April 8, 2026—released to the public only in mid-July, because transparency apparently requires a three-month marination—the Supreme Court En Banc dismissed the consolidated indirect contempt petitions against political analyst Richard Heydarian, Akbayan Representative Perci Cendaña, and the magnificently ungovernable Larry Gadon. The 87-page Leonen-authored decision is being celebrated as a triumph of free speech. And it is. But let us not mistake institutional self-preservation dressed in doctrinal robes for constitutional heroism. The Court did the right thing for reasons far more complicated—and far less noble—than its press releases suggest.

***“87 Pages. 3 Months. 1 Mirror. The Court Protects Itself Best.”***

THE PETITIONERS: Duterte’s Legal Errand Boys

The contempt petitions were filed by Attorneys Mark Tolentino, Rolex Suplico, and Ferdinand Topacio—a triumvirate of Duterte-aligned lawyers whose sudden concern for judicial dignity would be touching if it weren’t so transparently transactional. One searches in vain for their contempt petitions against Duterte allies who have called judges corrupt, incompetent, or worse. Selective indignation is not principle; it is public relations with a filing fee.

Topacio, the combative lawyer and longtime Duterte ally known for high-profile, politically charged cases, filed against Gadon with theatrical outrage that suggests either profound sincerity or profound belief that the rest of us are too stupid to notice the difference. The petitions characterized the respondents’ statements as “malicious, scandalous and offensive”—words that function less as legal standards and more as performative pearl-clutching.

The real question was not whether the Court’s dignity had been harmed, but whether the Court could be weaponized as a tool of political retaliation. The answer, mercifully, was no. These petitions were lawfare, pure and simple—the use of legal processes to punish enemies. That the Court saw through this charade is commendable. That it took 87 pages to say “we’re not falling for this” is less so.

THE RESPONDENTS: Imperfect Messengers

Richard Heydarian committed the unforgivable sin of stating a fact: 13 of the 15 sitting justices were appointed by Rodrigo Duterte. This is not speculation or calumny—it is arithmetic. The insinuation of bias is debatable; the number is not. The Court acknowledged this while delivering a gentle scold about “more nuanced understanding”—advice one receives with the enthusiasm reserved for unsolicited dietary suggestions.

Perci Cendaña called the Court the “Supreme Coddler” of Sara Duterte. This is a rather good line—pithy, alliterative, and not entirely without merit given that the Court had just shielded the Vice President from impeachment on procedural grounds while declining to address the substance of the allegations. The Court found this “arguably disrespectful” but ultimately protected as political speech on “grave matters of national importance.”

And then there is Larry Gadon. The man who called the Court a “lapdog of the Dutertes” is the same man disbarred in 2023 for calling journalist Raissa Robles a “putang ina mo.” If anyone’s speech should test the boundaries of protected criticism, it is Gadon’s. Yet the Court cleared him anyway—a deliberate, almost ostentatious display of strength. The Court was saying: we are so secure in our legitimacy that even this man cannot rattle us. Or was it?

THE RULING: Incitement Test as Institutional Self-Defense

The doctrinal heart of the decision is the “incitement test”—requiring proof that speech was “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and “likely to incite or produce such action.” This adapts the American Brandenburg v. Ohio standard into Philippine contempt law, significantly tightening the more malleable “tendency to degrade” language in Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the Rules of Court.

The Court distinguished its prior ruling against Lorraine Badoy, found guilty of indirect contempt in 2024 for threatening a specific judge and encouraging the bombing of judges’ offices. Badoy’s speech presented actual, imminent danger to identifiable judicial officers. Heydarian, Cendaña, and Gadon’s speech did not. This distinction is analytically sound.

But let us be clear: the incitement test is not just a standard; it is a shield. By setting the contempt bar at actual incitement to imminent lawlessness, the Court has made it extraordinarily difficult for anyone to succeed in a future contempt petition based on political criticism. This protects the Court as much as it protects critics—because every time the Court punishes a critic, it creates a martyr and reinforces the narrative that it is thin-skinned and authoritarian. The Court did the right thing because doing the wrong thing would have hurt the Court. That is not heroism; that is rational self-interest in judicial robes.

THE UNPACKING: Contempt Power Preserved, Speech Protected

The ruling preserves the Court’s authority to punish contempt involving “intimidation, threats, or conduct that genuinely obstructs judicial proceedings.” The incitement test does not eliminate contempt power; it channels it toward cases of genuine danger while removing it from cases of mere criticism.

This finds support in established precedents. In re: Almacen (G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970) recognized that courts must “exercise great care” before punishing criticism. Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 27, 1988) found contempt where statements went beyond criticism to “degradation of the judicial office.” Badoy (A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC, February 29, 2024) found contempt where threats created “clear and present danger.” The 2026 ruling synthesizes these into a coherent standard: criticism is protected; threats and incitement are not.

This framework is grounded in Rule 71, Section 3(d) (“any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice”), Article III, Section 4 (free speech), and Article VIII, Section 12 (inherent contempt power) of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The legal framework that emerges:

Protected Speech (no contempt): Criticism of judicial decisions, even if harsh or offensive; factual observations about judicial composition; political characterizations of rulings; general expressions of distrust.

Unprotected Speech (potential contempt): Direct threats against identifiable judges; incitement to violence against court personnel; speech intended to produce imminent interference with pending proceedings; conduct going beyond criticism to actual obstruction.

The Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA, A.M. No. 22-09-01-SC) provides additional context. Canon II, Section 14 warns against “insinuation of improper motive” without basis. Under the ruling, CPRA ethical standards remain applicable to lawyers—but do not transform protected criticism into contempt. A lawyer calling a court a “lapdog” may face ethical scrutiny; a private citizen faces none.

THE DEEPER GAME: The “13 of 15” Problem

Here is the uncomfortable truth: 13 of 15 justices were appointed by Rodrigo Duterte. The July 25, 2025 decision in Duterte v. House of Representatives voided the Articles of Impeachment against Sara Duterte on procedural grounds—convenient for the daughter of the man who appointed most of the justices. Is this proof of bias? No. Is it proof that the appearance of bias is a legitimate subject of public concern? Absolutely. The Court answered the contempt question without answering the legitimacy question—because the legitimacy question is harder, and courts are not built for that kind of institutional introspection.

THE PENDING SPECTER: Sotto and the Credibility Test

The ruling leaves one critical question: what about Senate President Vicente Sotto III? In February 2026, petitioners including Topacio filed a contempt petition against Sotto over his characterization of the Court’s finality ruling as a “sad day for Constitutional Law” and suggestions of Charter change to strip judicial power. The Court ordered Sotto to answer in May 2026; no decision has been made public.

Sotto’s statements go beyond criticism to structural retaliation—a threat of constitutional amendment to reduce judicial power. Under the incitement test, this should remain protected—Charter change requires supermajority votes and a plebiscite, hardly “imminent.” But the temptation to treat Sotto differently will be strong. If the Court applies a different standard to Sotto, the incitement test will be revealed as a selective shield rather than a principled standard. The legal community should watch this case closely.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Judicial Appointment Reform. Strengthen Judicial and Bar Council independence through transparency requirements and limitations on presidential discretion, reducing the perception that the Court is an extension of the appointing president’s political machine.
Anti-SLAPP Protections. Require bonds for costs in contempt petitions, impose mandatory sanctions for frivolous filings, and create expedited dismissal procedures for petitions failing to allege specific, imminent harm.
Transparency in Decision Release. The three-month promulgation-to-release gap is unacceptable. The Court should adopt simultaneous release policies and publicly explain any delays.
Civics Education. Strengthen civics education and legal journalism to help citizens distinguish legitimate criticism from baseless attacks—reducing the power of demagogues who profit from confusion.
Codification of the Incitement Test. Congress should codify this standard in amendments to Rule 71, providing statutory clarity and reducing the risk of future retreat to more speech-restrictive standards.
Political Party Reform. Strengthen programmatic, policy-based parties to reduce incentives for weaponizing impeachment, contempt, and other legal processes for dynastic political advantage.

CONCLUSION: A Better Philippines Is Possible

The ruling reinforces core constitutional principles that deserve celebration: political speech occupies the highest tier of constitutional protection; judicial legitimacy flows from fidelity to law, not immunity from scrutiny; contempt power is exceptional and narrow, reserved for real threats—not silencing dissent.

The incitement test is not a license for lawlessness; it is a standard for distinguishing protected speech from unprotected conduct. The Badoy precedent remains: speech crossing from criticism to intimidation can and should be punished.

To the youth of the Philippines: this ruling is your ruling. The free speech protections it affirms are your protections. Use them. Demand better government, fairer institutions, and a political system serving the many rather than the few.

To the legal community: defend this precedent. Hold the Court to its own standard. The incitement test will be tested—by political pressure, by the temptation to make exceptions. Demand consistency.

To the petitioners: you lost not because the Court is biased, but because your petitions lacked legal merit. The incitement test is a standard. Meet it or go home.

The Supreme Court has shown it can absorb criticism without collapsing. Now the rest of the Philippine state—the executive, the legislature, the bureaucracy—must develop the same institutional maturity. A democracy in which only courts tolerate dissent remains dangerously fragile.

The rule of law is not the rule of lawyers. It is the rule of principles that bind the powerful and protect the powerless. The 2026 contempt ruling affirms those principles. Now we must build the institutions, the culture, and the political will to make them real.

Mabuhay ang malayang pamamahayag. Mabuhay ang demokrasya. Mabuhay ang Pilipinas.

Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo is a legal analyst, political commentator, and proprietor of Kweba ni Barok. He believes in the rule of law, the supremacy of the Constitution, and the absolute necessity of mocking the powerful until they do the right thing.

Key Citations

A. Legal & Official Sources

The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987, http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/.
Supreme Court of the Philippines. “Rule 71. Contempt.” Rules of Court, 1 July 1997, The Lawphil Project, https://lawphil.net/courts/rules/rc_1-71_civil.html#r71.
In the Matter of Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen in G.R. No. L-27654 (Antonio H. Calero vs. Virginia Y. Yaptinchay), February 18, 1970. lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1970/feb1970/gr_27654_1970.html.
Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 27, 1988. lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/apr1988/gr_l-79690_1988.html.
A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC (Re: Statements Made by Lorraine Marie T. Badoy Allegedly Threatening Judge Marlo A. Magdoza-Malagar), February 29, 2024. sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-finds-lorraine-badoy-guilty-of-indirect-contempt-for-attacks-against-judge-warns-online-influencers-to-verify-truthfulness-of-posts/.
Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, A.M. No. 22-09-01-SC, April 11, 2023. https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/22-09-01-sc-code-of-professional-responsibility-and-accountability/.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). http://www.oyez.org/cases/1968/492.

B. News Reports

De Villa, Kathleen. “SC Dismisses Raps vs Critics of VP Duterte Ruling.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 17 July 2026, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/2265320/sc-dismisses-raps-vs-critics-of-vp-ruling.