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KWEBA ni BAROK

The Queen of Postponements: Sara Duterte’s Arraignment and the Fine Art of Buying Time

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Louis ‘Barok’ Biraogo

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Sorority Sisters, Pending TROs, and a Judge Who Just Needs More Time to “Study All These Things”

By Louis ‘Barok‘ C. Biraogo | October 10, 2026

SPOILER alert: Sara Duterte is not the first politician to discover that procedural rules are a wonderful thing.

The Vice President was supposed to be arraigned Friday on three counts of grave threats. Instead, she showed up at Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 98, smiled for the cameras, and walked out without entering a plea. Again.

The reason? Two pending matters: a motion for partial reconsideration ad cautelam of the judge’s denial of the defense’s inhibition motion, and a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC) seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO). Presiding Judge Maria Angelica de Ramos “deemed it best to study all these things” and reset the arraignment.

Translation: The judge blinked.

Now, before the defense bar floods my inbox with angry letters about “judicial courtesy” and “prudent case management,” let’s be clear about what actually happened here. This is the second postponement. The first one came on September 11, also justified by the pending SC petition. The arraignment has now been deferred twice, and the defense declined to disclose when it might actually happen.

If this were a traffic court, the judge would have entered a plea for the accused. But Sara Duterte is not just any accused. She is the Vice President of the Philippines, an impeachable officer, and—perhaps most importantly—a political problem that no one in the judiciary seems eager to solve.

Sara Duterte Arraignment Postponed Again: Justice Hits Snooze

The Immunity Argument That Isn’t

Let’s talk about the elephant in the courtroom: the immunity claim.

Defense counsel Paul Laurence Lim has argued that as a sitting impeachable official, Duterte is immune from criminal prosecution until she is either convicted by the Senate impeachment court or resigns. The theory is that impeachment must come first—that the Constitution’s framers intended impeachable officers to be shielded from ordinary criminal process while in office.

This is a creative argument. It is also, as far as Philippine constitutional law is concerned, not particularly good.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has been unambiguous: immunity from suit applies only to the President, and the Vice President does not enjoy that protection. The constitutional text does not mention vice-presidential immunity. The Supreme Court’s 2025 ruling in G.R. Nos. 278353 and 278359 (Sara Z. Duterte v. House of Representatives) recognized “limited procedural immunity” for impeachable officers, but that case dealt with impeachment proceedings, not criminal prosecution. As one legal scholar noted, the Court’s discussion of immunity in that ruling could arguably be considered obiter dictum—a passing observation, not a binding holding.

Even Attorney Sonny Matula, who described the defense’s position as having a “strong and legitimate legal point,” cautioned against treating the 2025 ruling as a definitive answer. The case dealt with impeachment, not criminal prosecution. The immunity issue “was not the principal question directly decided by the Supreme Court.”

So what we have is a defense strategy built on a constitutional theory that has no direct Supreme Court precedent, no textual basis, and has been rejected by the executive branch’s own prosecutors. And yet the arraignment has been postponed twice.

This is not justice. This is procedural jiu-jitsu.

The Sorority Sister Problem

Now let’s talk about Judge de Ramos.

The judge disclosed in open court on August 27 that she and Vice President Duterte are sorority sisters—both members of Sororitas Reginae Juris at the San Beda College of Law. The sorority’s motto, according to one report, is “Unbreakable: Forged by Resilience. Our sisterhood is a powerful testament to unity and unwavering support.”

Unwavering support. That’s the kind of language you want from a judge handling a criminal case against your sorority sister.

To her credit, Judge de Ramos disclosed the relationship voluntarily. That shows a certain level of transparency. But disclosure is not the same as recusal. The defense filed a motion for inhibition, which the judge denied. The defense then filed a motion for partial reconsideration ad cautelam—a procedural maneuver that essentially says, “We’re asking you to reconsider, but we’re preserving the issue for appeal because we know you’ll probably say no.”

Here’s the uncomfortable question: Would a judge who is not sorority sisters with the accused have postponed this arraignment twice?

The prosecution has argued that the sorority connection does not meet the legal threshold for mandatory disqualification under Rule 137, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court) (Disqualification of Judicial Officers). That’s technically correct—sorority membership is not a listed ground for compulsory inhibition. But the Rules also allow for voluntary inhibition for “just or valid causes,” and A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC (Code of Judicial Conduct) requires judges to avoid not just actual impropriety but the appearance of impropriety.

A reasonable observer might wonder why a judge who shares a lifelong organizational bond with the accused—a bond whose stated values include “unwavering support”—is the one deciding whether to postpone her arraignment, deny her inhibition motion, and ultimately preside over her trial.

Judge de Ramos was appointed to the judiciary by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in March 2025. That’s the same President whom Sara Duterte allegedly threatened to have killed. The same President whose political alliance with the Duterte family has collapsed in spectacular fashion.

None of this proves bias. But it does raise questions that a recusal would have answered cleanly.

Rule 65 Says What Now?

Let’s get into the procedural weeds for a moment, because this is where the defense’s strategy gets really interesting.

Under Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Court (Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus), filing a petition for certiorari does not automatically stay the proceedings in the lower court. The trial court retains jurisdiction unless and until the higher court issues a TRO or injunction.

The Supreme Court explained this in G.R. No. 166859 (Republic v. Sandiganbayan): a pending certiorari petition does not justify suspending proceedings below. There is a narrow exception for “judicial courtesy,” where continuing would render the Supreme Court’s eventual ruling meaningless. But that exception requires a specific justification—not just the existence of a pending petition.

Has the Supreme Court issued a TRO? No. The defense is asking for one, but as of Friday, there was no indication that the Court had granted it.

So on what legal basis did Judge de Ramos postpone the arraignment?

The defense says the judge wanted to “study all these things.” That’s not a legal standard. That’s a scheduling decision dressed up as judicial prudence.

The prosecution could have objected. They could have cited Rule 65, Section 7 and demanded that the arraignment proceed. They could have pointed out that the defense is using a pending petition as a de facto stay—precisely what the Rules prohibit. Instead, the arraignment was reset.

This is the pattern that should worry anyone who cares about the rule of law: procedural delay becomes the outcome, not a byproduct.

The Impeachment Parallel

While Sara Duterte’s criminal case crawls forward, her impeachment trial in the Senate is moving with unusual speed.

Senate President Win Gatchalian has said a verdict is possible before December. The impeachment court has revised its voting formula to ensure that senators who are unable to participate—due to detention, absence, or medical leave—don’t paralyze the proceedings. The prosecution has reduced its witness list. Hearings are running full days.

The contrast is striking. The impeachment court, facing a constitutional deadline and public pressure, is pushing forward. The criminal court, facing the same accused and the same alleged conduct, is postponing arraignments.

One might reasonably ask: Is the criminal case being deliberately slow-walked to avoid interfering with the impeachment trial? Or is the defense using the criminal case as a parallel venue for delay, hoping that one proceeding will produce a favorable outcome that moots the other?

The defense has argued that the alleged threats are also part of the impeachment articles—that the same conduct cannot be simultaneously prosecuted criminally and impeached. Former Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Salvador Panelo called this a possible “constitutional incongruity.”

But the Constitution itself addresses this. Article XI, Section 3(7) of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines (1987 Constitution) states that judgment in impeachment cases “shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office,” but “the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.”

The text is clear: impeachment does not preclude criminal prosecution. It explicitly preserves it.

The defense’s “impeachment first” theory is not supported by the Constitution’s plain language. It is a litigation position, not a constitutional principle.

What Comes Next?

The Supreme Court will eventually rule on the certiorari petition. It will either grant a TRO—effectively freezing the criminal case while the Court considers the immunity question—or deny it and allow the RTC to proceed.

If the Court grants the TRO, it will be making a significant statement about the scope of immunity for impeachable officers. If it denies, the case proceeds, and the defense will have to enter a plea.

Meanwhile, Judge de Ramos will rule on the motion for partial reconsideration of her inhibition denial. Given that she already denied the motion once, it would be surprising if she reverses herself now.

And the arraignment will be rescheduled. Again.

The question is whether the third time will be the charm—or whether we’re watching a masterclass in how to make a criminal case disappear without ever actually dismissing it.

Sara Duterte is not above the law. But she is, apparently, above the arraignment calendar.

Barok C. Biraogo is a lawyer and the author of the Kweba ni Barok blog. He has never been sorority sisters with anyone he has prosecuted.

Key Citations

A. Legal & Official Sources

  • The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987, http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/the-1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines/the-1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-article-xi/.
  • Supreme Court of the Philippines. Rules of Court. Rule 137, Section 1, Disqualification of Judicial Officers. Lawphil Project, lawphil.net/courts/supreme/rc/rc_137_judicial.html.
  • Supreme Court of the Philippines. A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. Amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 7. 2007, lawphil.net/courts/rules/am_07-7-12-sc_2007.html.
  • Supreme Court of the Philippines. A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. 27 Apr. 2004, lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/apr2004/am_03_05_01_sc_2004.html.
  • Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan. G.R. No. 166859, 26 June 2006. Supreme Court E-Library, elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/22/43386.
  • Sara Z. Duterte v. House of Representatives. G.R. Nos. 278353 and 278359, 25 July 2025. Lawphil Project, lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2025/jul2025/gr_278353_2025.html.

B. News Reports

Louis ‘Barok‘ C. Biraogo

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