When the President’s Son Becomes the House’s Budget Powerbroker, Who Makes Sure the People’s Money Doesn’t Become Family Business?
By Louis ‘Barok’ C. Biraogo — November 19, 2026
THERE is something wonderfully convenient about being the President’s son, the House Majority Leader, and the representative of a congressional district that apparently has discovered the secret formula for attracting billions in infrastructure funding.
While other congressmen plead for roads, bridges, drainage systems, and flood-control projects, Ilocos Norte’s First District appears to have found a particularly effective way of getting the government’s attention: it has Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in Malacañang and Ferdinand Alexander Marcos III in Congress.
Coincidence? Perhaps.
But when ₱26.87 billion enters the conversation, coincidence deserves a congressional hearing.
According to Daily Tribune’s November 16 report, Ilocos Norte’s First District Engineering Office received approximately ₱22.13 billion in appropriations from 2023 through 2026. Another ₱4.74 billion appears in the House version of the proposed 2027 national budget.
That brings the combined figure to ₱26.87 billion.
There is an important qualification: the ₱4.74 billion remains proposed funding, not an enacted appropriation. Nor does an appropriation mean the money has already been released, spent, or pocketed.
But let us not allow accounting terminology to distract us from the more interesting question.
How did one congressional district become such an extraordinary beneficiary of the national infrastructure budget?
The answer deserves considerably more than the usual presidential-family reassurance that everything is perfectly normal.

The magic trick: From ₱369 million to ₱4.74 billion
The most revealing number is not ₱26.87 billion. It is ₱369.43 million.
That was the amount in the National Expenditure Program prepared by the executive for Sandro Marcos’s district in 2027.
Then came the House version.
Suddenly, the figure became ₱4.74 billion.
That is an increase of approximately 1,183 percent, or an additional ₱4.37 billion.
BetterGov.PH reportedly identified 433 projects in the House proposal, including 405 projects worth approximately ₱4.37 billion that were absent from the original executive submission.
Four hundred and five projects!
Apparently, somebody discovered 405 infrastructure emergencies between the preparation of the President’s budget and its arrival in the House.
What happened? Did Ilocos Norte suddenly experience a geological transformation? Did its roads collectively collapse? Did the coastline move? Did every barangay discover a previously unknown bridge deficiency?
Perhaps the projects are entirely legitimate. But if they are, the government should have no difficulty explaining their sudden appearance.
Who proposed them? Who evaluated them? Who approved their technical specifications? Where are the engineering designs, feasibility studies, programs of work, and certificates of implementability?
And, most importantly, why were they not included in the original executive budget?
A legitimate infrastructure project should not need a midnight introduction and a political godparent to justify its existence.
The public deserves the project documents, not another performance of budgetary prestidigitation.
The pork barrel that refuses to die
Here is where the controversy becomes considerably more interesting.
The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism’s November 29, 2025 investigation, “‘Allocables’ Are the New Pork and Sandro Marcos and Martin Romualdez Are the Pork Barrel Kings,” reported that Sandro’s district received approximately ₱15.8 billion in Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) allocable funding from 2023 to 2025, the highest among 252 congressional districts.
Former House Speaker Martin Romualdez’s Leyte district reportedly received approximately ₱14.4 billion.
Two politically influential figures. Two extraordinarily funded districts. One budgetary system whose allocation formula has attracted serious questions about transparency.
The PCIJ investigation raises an uncomfortable possibility: that the traditional pork barrel has not disappeared but has learned to wear a different uniform.
Instead of distributing discretionary funds through the familiar Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), the money moves through DPWH allocations and district engineering offices.
Ingenious!
The old pork barrel has apparently undergone an administrative makeover. It has acquired engineering terminology, government paperwork, and a respectable institutional address.
Unfortunately, changing the name of a mechanism does not necessarily change its constitutional character.
In Belgica v. Ochoa (2013), the Supreme Court invalidated the PDAF system because legislators cannot exercise post-enactment control over the identification, modification, and implementation of projects funded by public appropriations.
The critical question is therefore not whether Sandro personally holds the money.
It is whether legislators exercise influence that effectively allows them to control the executive implementation of projects.
If they merely advocate for legitimate projects during budget deliberations, that is generally permissible.
If they determine project implementation, direct releases, manipulate modifications, or exercise executive authority after enactment, we enter considerably more dangerous constitutional territory.
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines (1987 Constitution) does not prohibit congressmen from asking for bridges.
It prohibits them from becoming unofficial public-works secretaries with their own discretionary kingdoms.
The family discount—or the family premium?
Sandro’s defense deserves examination.
He argues that Ilocos Norte has historically been shortchanged and deserves greater infrastructure attention. He also reportedly invoked his father’s instruction to ensure that the province received greater attention.
These arguments are not inherently unreasonable.
Ilocos Norte has coastal communities, rivers, agricultural infrastructure requirements, and potential disaster vulnerabilities. Seawalls, roads, bridges, irrigation, and flood-control projects can justify substantial public investment.
A district with 320,000 residents might legitimately require more infrastructure spending than a more populous district.
Population alone is not an adequate allocation formula.
But historical neglect must be demonstrated, not merely declared.
Where is the comparative infrastructure assessment? Where is the district’s historical spending per capita? Where are the road-density figures, flood-risk assessments, coastal vulnerability studies, and infrastructure-deficit measurements?
And why should the President’s son receive an allocation so dramatically higher than the executive originally considered appropriate?
There is nothing inherently illegal about a presidential child serving in Congress. Nor does the 1987 Constitution automatically prohibit the President from pursuing development in his home province.
But the combination of presidential authority, legislative leadership, and extraordinary district funding creates an obvious appearance-of-favoritism problem.
The public is entitled to ask whether Ilocos Norte received money because it had the greatest infrastructure needs—or because its congressman had the greatest access to political power.
That is not an accusation of criminality. It is a question of institutional integrity.
And it is a question the Marcos administration cannot answer by invoking filial affection.
BetterGov’s numbers: Follow the spreadsheet
BetterGov.PH deserves credit for examining public budget documents and identifying substantial differences between the executive proposal and the House version.
But watchdogs must also be watched.
There are discrepancies requiring reconciliation.
BetterGov’s reported 2023–2025 district engineering office appropriations total approximately ₱18.95 billion. PCIJ’s reported ₱15.8 billion concerns DPWH allocables. An unnamed lawmaker reportedly cited a 2025 allocation of ₱12.91 billion, a figure that cannot presently be reconciled with the reported ₱7.38 billion in the district engineering office appropriation.
These figures cannot simply be added together or treated as interchangeable.
Appropriations, allocables, allotments, obligations, and disbursements are different accounting categories.
BetterGov should publish its complete project-level dataset, methodology, and source documents.
It should identify exactly which projects belong to which budget categories and explain how it arrived at its totals.
A watchdog loses credibility when its arithmetic becomes as difficult to follow as the government’s budget amendments.
But there is an important distinction: questioning BetterGov’s methodology does not eliminate the government’s obligation to explain the allocations.
If its numbers are wrong, produce the correct numbers.
If its conclusions are exaggerated, produce the documents.
Attacking the messenger is not a substitute for answering the questions.
Four hundred and five projects and the contractor question
The most important investigation may not concern Sandro’s political motivations at all.
It concerns the people who will eventually build the projects.
Who are the contractors? Who owns the companies? Are they established construction firms with adequate financial capacity? Are the same companies repeatedly winning contracts? Are there common directors, beneficial owners, addresses, or subcontractors?
Do the winning bids demonstrate genuine competition?
Are project costs reasonable?
Are contract variations being used to increase original prices?
Are the completed structures physically delivering what the government paid for?
The country’s flood-control corruption scandal has already demonstrated the danger of treating infrastructure appropriations as evidence of infrastructure accomplishment.
A billion-peso allocation can produce a useful bridge.
It can also produce an expensive monument to political stupidity.
The difference is determined by engineering, procurement, inspection, and accountability—not by the number of photographs taken during groundbreaking ceremonies.
There is no evidence in the material examined establishing that Sandro received kickbacks or that the 405 projects were awarded to politically connected contractors. Such allegations must not be manufactured.
But the contractor trail deserves independent examination before another infrastructure scandal becomes another national embarrassment.
The Senate must stop playing budgetary theatre
Senate Finance Committee Chair JV Ejercito has demanded programs of work, certificates of implementability, Regional Development Council endorsements, and geotagged photographs.
Senate President Sherwin Gatchalian has also announced the removal of 295 projects worth approximately ₱8.836 billion because of documentary and technical deficiencies.
These are sensible safeguards.
But the Senate must explain precisely which projects were removed, why they were removed, and whether any belonged to Sandro’s proposed allocation.
The same documentary standards must apply to every congressman.
The Senate should neither protect the President’s son nor manufacture a political spectacle around him.
It should scrutinize the projects, not the surnames.
And if the House cannot explain the additional ₱4.37 billion, the Senate should have no difficulty reducing or removing projects that fail the necessary tests.
A budget is not a family reunion.
The real scandal is institutional
The Marcos administration faces a choice.
It can defend Sandro’s allocation through evidence, publish the technical justifications, and demonstrate that the projects satisfy objective national infrastructure priorities.
Or it can continue offering political assurances while leaving the public to wonder why one district suddenly became the beneficiary of a budgetary windfall.
Sandro, meanwhile, has an opportunity to demonstrate that being the President’s son does not mean being exempt from scrutiny.
He should publish all 405 additional projects, identify their proponents, disclose their technical evaluations, and explain the dramatic difference between the NEP and House figures.
If the projects are legitimate, transparency is his strongest defense.
If they are not, no amount of political influence can make them legitimate.
BetterGov should publish its underlying data. DPWH should disclose the project and contractor records. Department of Budget and Management (DBM) should explain the original exclusions. The Senate should publish its review. Commission on Audit (COA) should examine actual implementation and expenditures. The Office of the Ombudsman should investigate any specific evidence of unlawful conduct.
And the President should resist the temptation to treat criticism of his son’s allocation as criticism of Ilocos Norte itself.
The people of Ilocos Norte deserve infrastructure. So do the people of Leyte, Rizal, Bulacan, Davao, and every other district whose representatives lack presidential bloodlines.
That is precisely the point.
Public money should follow public need, not political proximity.
The ₱26.87-billion question is ultimately bigger than Sandro Marcos.
It is about a system in which political influence may determine who gets the money, who identifies the projects, and who eventually receives the contracts.
The old pork barrel was declared unconstitutional.
If its successor is operating through district engineering offices and opaque allocables, the country deserves to know.
After all, a pig does not stop being a pig simply because somebody puts a hard hat on it.
And in Philippine budget politics, apparently, even pork can now qualify as infrastructure.
Key Citations
A. Legal & Official Sources
- Belgica v. Ochoa. G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493, and 209251, 19 Nov. 2013. Lawphil, lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html.
- The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987, http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/.
B. News Reports
- Orcullo, Jerod. “Sandro’s District Racks Up P22B.” Daily Tribune, 16 Nov. 2026, tribune.net.ph/2026/11/16/sandros-district-racks-up-p22b.
- Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. “‘Allocables’ Are the New Pork and Sandro Marcos and Martin Romualdez Are the Pork Barrel Kings.” PCIJ, 29 Nov. 2025, pcij.org/2025/11/29/allocables-are-the-new-pork/.

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