The DILG Secretary, a Former Bangsamoro MP, and the Art of Naming Names Before Proving Crimes

PDEA Had the Evidence and Kept Quiet. Jonvic Remulla Had a Press Conference and Named Names.“

By Louis ‘Barok’ C. Biraogo — October 16, 2026

LET’S begin with a confession: I was wrong. In my previous blog, I mocked the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for knowing “everything” about the Laos shabu case except names, accounts, and suspects. I suggested the agency was hoarding intelligence like a miser hoards pesos, all while the alleged mastermind enjoyed the comforts of anonymity and possibly a nice apartment in Hong Kong.

Well, PDEA has now shared. And the name they’ve shared is Edriezan Hadji Nasser Rimbang, former Bangsamoro Transition Authority parliament member, failed 2025 candidate for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) parliament, and—according to Interior Secretary Jonvic Remulla—the “financier of the entire operation.”

There’s just one problem. The PDEA, the agency that supposedly knows things, didn’t name him. The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary did.

Let that sink in. The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency—the lead agency under Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), the one with the mandate, the intelligence, the task force, and the financial trail—kept its mouth shut. The DILG, whose statutory role in drug enforcement is supervisory at best, walked up to a Palace briefing, presented a “link diagram,” and dropped a name like a prosecutor reading an indictment.

If you’re confused about who’s actually running this investigation, you’re not alone. So is the chain of command.

**“PDEA Builds the Case. DILG Breaks the News. Justice? Still Loading.”**

The Curious Case of the Disappearing Protocol

Here’s what PDEA spokesperson Joseph Frederick Calulut said on October 15, just one day before Remulla’s bombshell: the agency had identified a Mindanao politician as the financier, but would not disclose the identity because “case buildup is ongoing.”

PDEA even described the financier’s political affiliation: “a politician from the south whose political party is against the current administration.” They said charges would be filed “in the coming days.” They mentioned bank transfers, task groups, and a web of accomplices. What they did not do was say the name.

Then Remulla said the name.

This is not a minor procedural quibble. Under Executive Order No. 61, series of 2018 (EO 61), PDEA is designated the “sole agency” responsible for anti-drug operations. The DILG Secretary supervises the Philippine National Police (PNP) and local governments. He does not run PDEA investigations. He does not decide when suspects are named. He certainly does not override operational protocols designed to protect case buildup and preserve the integrity of a transnational investigation.

Unless, of course, the protocol was never the point. The point was the press conference.

Rimbang: Sultan, Politician, and Now Alleged Drug Financier

Who is Edriezan Rimbang? According to public records, he was a member of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority from 2019 to 2022. He authored legislation. He proposed resolutions, including one recognizing Rodrigo Duterte’s “Meranaw lineage.” He ran for the BARMM parliament in 2025 as a “staunch supporter” of the former president and lost.

And now, according to the DILG Secretary, he allegedly financed a $49,500 charter flight to move 521 kilograms of methamphetamine from Laos to Manila.

The PNP has added a helpful detail: the politician allegedly involved “had previously been involved in illegal drug cases.” When asked if he was on Duterte’s infamous 2019 narco-list, PNP spokesperson Col. Allen Rae Co declined to answer.

Declined to answer. How convenient. Because if Rimbang was on the narco-list, then the current administration just named a man who was publicly accused of drug involvement seven years ago—which raises the question of why he was never charged, or why the Duterte administration’s “war on drugs” somehow missed a sitting parliament member with alleged drug ties. If he wasn’t on the list, then the PNP’s “past drug cases” claim is either new information or carefully vague insinuation.

Either way, the public is left with an accusation and no charges. A name and no complaint. A “link diagram” and no verified evidence.

The Political Geometry of a Leak

Let’s map the political coordinates, because they’re not subtle.

Rimbang is described by PDEA as belonging to an “opposition” party relative to the Marcos administration. He is a Duterte supporter. He is from Mindanao, specifically Lanao del Sur. He lost his 2025 election.

The alleged financier, in other words, checks every box that makes a drug accusation politically useful: opposition figure, Duterte loyalist, Mindanao politician, electoral loser with diminished institutional protection.

Meanwhile, the DILG Secretary who named him is Jonvic Remulla—brother of Ombudsman Jesus Crispin Remulla, key Marcos ally, and a man who recently reimbursed ₱28,011 for drug test expenses after accusing Reina Mercedes, Isabela Vice Mayor Jeryll Harold Respicio of acting like a “drug addict.” Respicio tested negative.

Jonvic Remulla has a pattern. He accuses. He insinuates. He presents himself as the administration’s tough-talking drug warrior. And when his accusations collapse, he pays the bill and moves on.

This time, the bill may be larger. Because this time, he didn’t accuse a vice mayor of acting like an addict. He accused a former parliament member of financing a ₱3.5 billion drug shipment.

The Evidence Problem: What Does “Financier” Actually Mean?

PDEA’s Calulut said the politician “paid $45,000 for the chartered plane, and not only that amount for the other expenses.” The PNP’s Col. Co said the politician “was the one who actually paid when the plane was chartered.”

Notice what’s missing: any mention of authenticated bank records, verified account ownership, or corroborating communications. The PDEA says it traced “bank transfers.” The PNP says the politician “had the financial means.”

This is the evidentiary equivalent of saying someone “looks like they could afford a nice car” and calling it grand theft auto.

Under RA 9165, Section 4 penalizes “financing” drug importation. But financing requires proof that the money was knowingly directed toward the illegal purpose—not merely that a person sent money, not merely that a person had money, and certainly not merely that a person’s political affiliation makes them a convenient suspect.

The PDEA hasn’t filed charges. The Department of Justice (DOJ) hasn’t announced a case. The Ombudsman hasn’t been asked to investigate. What we have is a cabinet secretary naming a political opponent as a drug financier based on evidence that remains, for now, entirely in the realm of official assertion.

The Sam Gor Phantom and the International Nexus

There’s another problem. PDEA claims the syndicate behind this shipment is Sam Gor, the transnational network formerly led by Tse Chi Lop. Tse was sentenced to 16 years in an Australian prison in December 2025—nearly a year before the Laos seizure.

How does a decapitated syndicate organize a $49,500 charter flight from Malaysia to Laos to Manila? PDEA doesn’t explain. They just invoke the name, because “Sam Gor” sounds like a triumph while “a fragmented network of regional actors we can’t currently identify” sounds like actual investigative work.

The international dimension also complicates the naming. The seizure occurred in Laos. The flight originated in Malaysia. A suspect allegedly fled to Hong Kong. Any Philippine prosecution must navigate mutual legal assistance frameworks, foreign evidence authentication, and jurisdictional questions that don’t disappear because a DILG Secretary held a press conference.

By naming Rimbang publicly before formal charges, Remulla hasn’t strengthened the case. He’s potentially compromised it—alerting co-conspirators, complicating diplomatic cooperation, and giving defense counsel a ready-made argument that the accusation was politically motivated from the start.

The Due Process Casualty

Here’s the constitutional problem, stated plainly: Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.”

Rimbang has not been accused in a criminal prosecution. He has not been charged. He has not had the opportunity to confront evidence or present a defense. He has been named in a Palace briefing by a cabinet secretary who is not a prosecutor, not an investigator, and not authorized to determine probable cause.

The Supreme Court, in Guingguing v. Court of Appeals, held that public figures must prove “actual malice” to succeed in libel cases—a high bar designed to protect robust public debate. But that doctrine assumes the speech in question is debate, not an official accusation delivered with the implicit authority of the state.

When a DILG Secretary says “Sultan Edriezan Rimbang is believed to be the financier of the entire operation,” he is not engaging in political commentary. He is using his office to brand a private citizen—a former public official, yes, but currently a private citizen—as a drug lord before any court has examined a single piece of evidence.

If Rimbang is innocent, the damage is already done. His name is now permanently linked to a ₱3.5 billion drug case. His political career is over. His reputation is destroyed. And the man who destroyed it faces no consequence, because qualified privilege will shield him, and actual malice is nearly impossible to prove.

What Should Happen Next (But Probably Won’t)

If the PDEA and PNP actually have evidence against Rimbang, they should file charges. Tomorrow. With authenticated bank records, with corroborating witness testimony, with a prosecutorial determination of probable cause. Let a court examine the evidence. Let Rimbang respond. Let the process work.

If they don’t have that evidence, Remulla should retract the accusation, publicly and unequivocally. The DILG has no business naming drug suspects. The PNP has no business leaking “past drug cases” to reporters. The PDEA has no business letting a cabinet secretary front its investigation.

And if the administration is serious about proving it’s different from the Duterte drug war—the one that killed thousands based on lists and suspicions and “nanlaban” narratives—it should demonstrate that difference by respecting due process, even for opposition politicians from Mindanao.

But I’m not holding my breath. The press conference happened. The name is out. The “link diagram” is circulating. And somewhere, Edriezan Rimbang is waking up to a life he didn’t choose, accused of a crime he may not have committed, by a government that has already convicted him in the court of public opinion.

The pilot who refused to load the luggage did more to stop this shipment than the entire Philippine law enforcement apparatus. And the DILG Secretary who named a suspect before filing a charge has done more to undermine the case than any defense lawyer ever could.

That’s not justice. That’s theater. And the audience—the Filipino public—deserves better than a government that can’t tell the difference.

Louis ‘Barok’ C. Biraogo is a Davao-born, UP Diliman-educated columnist and the driving force behind Kweba ni Barok Blog. He writes in English, Tagalog, and Cebuano because discourse should never be monolingual.

Key Citations

A. Legal & Official Sources

The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987, http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/.
Republic Act No. 9165. An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Repealing Republic Act No. 6425, Otherwise Known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes. Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 7 June 2002, http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2002/06/07/republic-act-no-9165/.
Executive Order No. 61, s. 2018. Modifying the Rates of Import Duty on Certain Imported Articles in Order to Implement the Philippine Tariff Commitments Pursuant to the Free Trade Agreement Between the European Free Trade Association States and the Philippines. Lawphil.net, 2 Aug. 2018, lawphil.net/executive/execord/eo2018/eo_61_2018.html.
Guingguing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128959, 30 Sept. 2005. Lawphil.net, http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_128959_2005.html.

B. News Reports

Biraogo, Louis ‘Barok’ C. “PDEA Knows Everything About the Laos Shabu Case. Except Names, Accounts, and Suspects.” KWEBA ni BAROK, 16 Oct. 2026, kwebanibarok.com/2026/10/16/pDEA-knows-everything-about-the-laos-shabu-case-except-names-accounts-and-suspects/.
“DILG tags Bangsamoro MP as politician in P3.5B shabu smuggling try from Laos.” GMA News Online, GMA Network, 15 Oct. 2026, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/.
“DILG tags 11 persons of interest in Laos drug haul.” ABS-CBN News, 16 Oct. 2026, http://www.abs-cbn.com/news/.
“‘Mindanao politician is drug plane funder.’” Manila Standard, 14 Oct. 2026, manilastandard.net/news/.
“Mindanao politician linked to Laos drug case faced past drug cases – PNP.” Inquirer.net, 15 Oct. 2026, newsinfo.inquirer.net/.
“PDEA links seized ‘shabu’ to Mindanao politician.” Inquirer Plus, 14 Oct. 2026, plus.inquirer.net/news/pdea-links-seized-shabu-to-mindanao-politician/.
“Independent bet, Moro Ako party among early birds as BARMM’s COC filing begins.” Rappler, 3 Nov. 2024, http://www.rappler.com/philippines/mindanao/independent-bet-moro-ako-party-early-birds-barmm-coc-filing-begins/.